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This conference has been largely about which lessons of past crises
can be used for the prevention of future crises, something that I take to be
important. A few months ago, Ned Phelps of Columbia wrote to the
Financial Times, complaining that the International Monetary Fund was
seeking to prevent crises, and stating that crises were a very healthy
phenomenon, a way for the system to get rid of various inefﬁciencies.
After a while, he sent me an e-mail asking why I had not replied to his
letter. I responded that I had not replied in the Financial Times because I
was certain that if I did, his answer would be “Aha, I caught you; you
actually believed that I meant what I said.”
In any case, many crises are unnecessary, preventable, and highly
damaging. Our goal must be to prevent crises that arise because institu-
tions are highly imperfect or because information is highly imperfect.
I will take up ﬁve topics, and will probably be mixing up a little what
is happening in the IMF with what I believe ought to be happening in the
international system to reduce the frequency of crises.
EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS
First, exchange rate systems. It is an astonishing fact that all the
massive crises of the past ﬁve years—the really big ones—have been
associated with the collapse of formally ﬁxed or quasi-ﬁxed exchange rate
systems: Mexico in 1994; the three Asian IMF program countries of
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea; Russia in 1998, in many ways the most
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1999. These crises offer strong evidence about the role of exchange rate
systems. The other piece of evidence is the crises that did not happen, for
instance in Turkey, South Africa, and Israel—contries that were hard hit
by contagion, but did not experience massive crises of a certain type.
What type of crisis is that? The sort in which, on a given day, the
entire basis of policy for the past 5 or 10 years, and the entire set of
assumptions on which the ﬁnancial structure has been built, are wiped
away. That type of crisis, with its unfortunate consequences, can probably
be avoided by actively using ﬂexible exchange rate systems.
One has to take note of the fact that the very hard pegs have
succeeded, and the bipolar approach to exchange rates, peg very hard or
ﬂoat, does seem to be justiﬁed by what has happened in recent years. That
view is consistent with the impossible trinity of a ﬂoating exchange rate,
free capital mobility, and a monetary policy devoted to domestic goals. I
believe the evidence points strongly to the bipolar conclusion, but there
are sensible and inﬂuential economists who believe intermediate regimes
can and should be maintained.
I should also note the extreme reluctance of some members of the
IMF to move away from pegged exchange rate systems. A number of
countries are operating with pegged rates in situations where more
ﬂexibility would be desirable. Typically we make the case you have just
heard. They say, “Yes, next year we are going to open up the band a
little.” Then you arrive next year, and they are thinking about how
difﬁcult it is, because there is no interbank market, and so forth. I do not
know what makes them so reluctant and so willing to court crisis.
Somebody suggested to me that fragile societies do not like change, but
not all the countries I am thinking of are fragile.
One other point: although the Asian crisis countries are still, Malay-
sia aside, formally ﬂoating, they are intervening to stabilize rates.
Fortunately, they have not pegged formally, and they retain the exchange
rate as a safety valve. However, the yearning is there for more exchange
rate stability than is likely to be developed through a freely ﬂoating
system, and so, those issues remain open in an important set of emerging
market countries.
TRANSPARENCY AND SURVEILLANCE
Point two: transparency. This really is important. Transparency
matters in two ways. We tend to emphasize the importance of having
informed investors, but a second factor is equally important: the con-
straints that transparency puts on policymakers. Certain things that
helped cause the Asian crisis, like the Thai central bank’s commitments in
the forward market, could not have occurred had adequate information
been out there. Why would they not have happened? Well, the crisis
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crisis would not have been as deep as it was. Also, the commitments in
the forward market would not have been made if the public had been
informed. Transparency about what governments do is a constraint on
policy, and transparency is also vital because it produces an informed set
of investors. Of course, these aspects interact.
We are doing a great deal now to improve transparency, particularly
through the creation of the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS),
an enhanced data set, which both emerging market and advanced
countries subscribe to and are making publicly available. We have
recently increased, by a large amount, the information on reserves that
countries make available under the SDDS. The information was due by
the end of May, 2000. Around June third, only 18 out of 47 countries had
submitted it, and we feared this one had not worked. But somehow by
June ﬁfteenth we were up to 40 out of 47 countries, and by now virtually
all 47 countries are publishing much better reserve data.
Just recently,1 the IMF decided, following a pilot project, that
member countries that want to publish their Article IV reports—the
regular surveillance reports by the Staff—will be allowed to do so. That
represents a major step forward in Fund transparency. In addition, we are
publishing extraordinary amounts of information about other aspects of
Fund activities. We even have accounts that are now understandable to
mere mortals and that meet the International Accounting Standards. The
discussion about efforts to increase transparency at the IMF and on the
part of member countries will continue, but we are now making most
information we have public—and that is a very good thing.
STANDARDS AND CODES FOR FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
Point three: standards and codes. You heard discussion earlier about
the creation of the International Standards for Securities Commissions
through IOSCO. A whole host of standards and codes have been issued,
including the Basle core banking standards and various others, some of
which the IMF produced.
Some developing countries are concerned that the industrialized
world is ganging up on them and forcing them to move too fast to
implement standards and codes. There should be no doubt that these
standards are good for countries to meet. The issue is how fast standards
should be adopted, what length of time should be given to make the
adjustments and to make sure that the adjustments are done well. These
standards are the essential foundation for building a modern economy
1 This sentence has been updated to reﬂect developments since June, 2000.
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gradually.
THE ROLE OF RESERVES
Point four: reserves. It is striking, and still a matter of some interest,
that countries that had very high reserves have done much better in
withstanding external ﬁnancial pressures than those with smaller re-
serves. Why is it that even countries with ﬂexible exchange rates seem to
beneﬁt from having very large reserves? And why has the indicator,
reserves over short-term debt, worked so well as one of the best single
predictors of crisis? At least one major country has also drawn the
conclusion that the level of reserves matters. Korea, two months before
the crisis in 1997, had about $35 billion in reserves. Two months later,
reserves were down to zero, and today they are up to $89 billion. They
seem to be aiming for $100 billion. Quite likely, when they get to 100, they
will aim higher.
Given that reserves seem to matter so much, the possibility of
providing precautionary lines of credit by the IMF or by the private sector
is well worth pursuing. Holding reserves is very expensive for most
emerging market countries: The gap between what the country pays to
borrow them and the return on holding them is typically several hundred
basis points.
The “contingent credit line” facility (CCL) developed by the IMF
would make lines of credit available to countries that have good
macroeconomic policies and meet certain standards in banking, statistics,
and so on. Such credit lines could greatly reduce the costs of having this
reserves cushion. We introduced the CCL in 1999. There have been no
takers so far, but the design of the CCL has recently been improved, to
make it more usable.
ASSESSMENTS OF NATIONAL FINANCIAL SECTORS
A ﬁfth point is ﬁnancial sector assessments. Apparently Thomas
Jefferson once said that banking establishments are more dangerous than
standing armies. We have seen it in these various crises. A massive
attempt is now under way to strengthen ﬁnancial systems. Together with
the World Bank, and with central banks and supervisory agencies, the
IMF is making it possible for member countries of the international
institutions to have a so-called ﬁnancial sector assessment.
A large and sophisticated World Bank–IMF team, including also
experts from national agencies, does a comprehensive report on the
strengths and weaknesses of the ﬁnancial sector in the country. These
assessments are voluntary, but the demand for them has increased
signiﬁcantly. They are very good. Some countries, like Canada, asked for
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good example. Well, they got an A1. Hong Kong has also had a ﬁnancial
sector assessment. Other countries have also had assessments, probably
because they genuinely want to know what is happening in their ﬁnancial
sectors, as assessed against the international standards.
Assessments are being done in some countries that have very weak
ﬁnancial sectors, and in some that are strong. Iran has had one. Colombia
has had one. It is a great program, and an important tool through which
the international community can help prevent and mitigate crises.
I hope the discussion of these ﬁve topics will persuade you that
much can be done, and much is being done—indeed more is being
done—to help reduce the frequency and virulence of crises.
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